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Financial management differs across households and this has various consequences for 
the financial outcomes and well-being of partners in households. A study has been 
performed on the financial management of couples, in households with or without 
children, in which data from both partners was collected on having joint and separate 
bank accounts, syncratic (joint) and autonomic (separate) financial management, the 
drivers of financial management, and the occurrence of financial problems. Based on 
the data, four financial management styles were distinguished: syncratic/joint, male-
dominant, female-dominant, and autonomic financial management styles. In the 
syncratic financial management style, partners have a joint bank account and take 
most financial decisions together. In the male/female-dominant decision styles, one 
partner (either husband or wife) takes the main decisions about how to spend from the 
joint bank account. In the autonomic money-management style, both partners have 
their own bank accounts, and can make their own decisions. As a conclusion, we find 
that both syncratic money management and having a joint instead of separate bank 
accounts correlate with fewer financial problems compared to male-dominant money 
management and having separate bank accounts. Working together as partners of a 
couple is beneficial for financial management and for avoiding financial problems. 
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In many economic household decision-making 
studies, households are the units of 
measurement, ignoring intra-household 
dynamics, such as bargaining, and joint or 
separate financial decision making of partners. 
Taking households as units of measurement and 
analysis may be sufficient and appropriate for 
macro studies on the developments of aggregate 
household spending and saving. It may also be 
sufficient in studies on assessing the influence of 
consumer confidence, income and tax policy, 
economic policy, and other factors on household 
spending and saving in general. However, taking 
households as units of measurement does not 
provide any insights in the dynamics of decision-
making processes, power and wealth differences 
between partners, differences in preferences and 
choice, financial management, outcome 
satisfaction and well-being of partners in 
households. The type of economic and, more 
specifically, financial decision making and choice 
in households is an important determinant of the 
quality and effectiveness of the decisions and the 
occurrence of financial problems in households. It 
is also an important determinant of unfavorable 
effects such as conflicts and (gender) inequality 
of power, and favorable effects such as 
satisfaction and well-being of partners in 
households (Burgoyne, 1990; Pahl, 1995; Vogler & 
Pahl, 1994). 
In this study, we describe household financial 
decision making and financial management 
models from different disciplines, and empirically  
investigate the joint versus separate financial  
 
management styles of couples, their drivers, and 
their outcomes in terms of the occurrence of 
financial problems.  
Due to, among others, technological progress, 
leading to an increasingly complex consumer 
environment and high speed of change, more 
knowledge and capabilities are required from 
partners in households in order to make optimal 
choices (Jappelli, 2010). Currently, the knowledge 
gap is increasing, especially in the consumer 
financial area (Willis, 2008). According to 
Braunstein and Welch (2002), there are several 
reasons for it. With the development of new 
technologies, such as the Internet, the amount of 
financial information available to households has 
increased considerably. Good financial 
knowledge, or financial literacy, to use this 
information and subsequently sound decision 
making and financial management differ largely 
between households (Jappelli, 2010) and are 
highly important for household financial 
management. 
Apart from technological progress, the quality of 
household financial decision making is important 
because government support in household 
financial affairs is reducing rapidly, leaving it to 
households themselves (thus assuming high 
levels of self-reliance and resilience), or to market 
agencies to fill the gap. Examples where the 
quality of decisions is highly dependent upon the 
self-reliance of citizens are privatization of health 
insurance and medical care provision, increased 
use of digital communication channels by 
government, digital payment systems, 




infrastructure (e.g., telecommunication), energy 
provision, and retirement funds. In all those cases, 
households have to make choices for alternative 
providers and contracts, often without much help 
from others. At the same time, household 
members are more and more treated as 
individuals in tax affairs, social benefits, and legal 
contracts, thus complicating family financial 
affairs further. Moreover, female labor market 
participation has increased, thus increasing the 
bargaining power of women in households. In 
such an environment, the need for bargaining 
between household partners is increasing, and 
differences in the partners’ bargaining power 
may lead to unbalanced outcomes or overall non-
optimal financial outcomes for the household as 
a whole. 
Recognizing the need for high-quality decision 
making of households, we have conducted a 
survey on different financial management styles 
of couples. We study the socioeconomic 
background of couples with different financial 
management styles, and the differences in 
financial outcomes, such as the occurrence of 
financial problems. 
The results of this study are relevant for banks to 
advise customers on their bank and savings 
accounts, for debt policy advisers to assist 
households in their financial management, and 
for consumers in general to improve their money 
management. Financial management of couples 
is an important determinant for improving 













2.1 Microeconomic models 
In microeconomics, different models have been 
used to capture household decision making: 
unitary models, bargaining models, and collective 
models (Himmelweit et al., 2013; Antonides and 
Van Klaveren, 2018). Unitary models assume only 
one single household utility function, without 
specifying individual preferences, and assuming 
that the provision of goods and time is based only 
on the pooled household members’ incomes. 
There are different types of unitary models. In 
Samuelson’s (1956) consensus model, the 
partners agree on spending and saving, such that 
one social utility function is sufficient to describe 
their behaviour. The consensus model does not 
capture bargaining and conflicts between 
partners, arising from the realization of personal 
rather than household goals. In Becker’s (1981) 
microeconomic model, the husband is the 
decision maker of the household taking his wife’s 
preferences into account. The husband’s utility 
function thus includes his wife’s preferences and 
serves as the household utility function. Unitary 
models assume income pooling, which is 
commonly arranged by setting up a joint bank 
account with full access by both partners of the 
household. 
 
However, couples often do not pool their incomes 
completely (Lundberg et al., 1997; Pahl, 2000; 
Burgoyne et al., 2007). Factors affecting income 
pooling are transaction costs (Treas, 1993), being 
married (vs. cohabiting), income, age, and the 





Income pooling is, for instance, more common for 
households with married partners, partners with 
more-or-less equal income, and households with 
children. Income pooling also assumes that it 
does not matter which expenses are paid from 
the husband’s income or from the wife’s income. 
However, Browning et al. (2006) find that in 
Denmark child benefits given to mothers, rather 
than to fathers, tend to increase children’s 
nutrition and well-being. Likewise, microcredit 
given to women in developing countries is often 
better spent on the education of children, or on 
investment in earning income capacity, than 
when given to men in a household (Fofana et al., 
2015). Thus, the unitary model does not provide a 
realistic and up-to-date view on intra-household 
dynamics, male and female functions in 
households, household decision making, and 
money management of partners. 
 
In contrast with unitary models, bargaining 
models of household financial decision making 
are based on the individual utility functions of 
decision makers: partners, older children, and 
other persons in the household (Manser & Brown, 
1980; McElroy & Horney, 1981). In cooperative 
bargaining models, the individual utility obtained 
within the household may be compared with the 
individual utility that might be obtained by each 
partner in case he or she would live outside the 
household (the so-called fall-back position or 
threat point). For instance, in case of a divorce. 
The difference in one’s utility (living outside vs. 
living within the household) is considered the 
2. Models of household 




opportunity cost of staying within the household. 
In cooperative bargaining models, household 
members negotiate in order to reach an 
agreement regarding household financial 
decisions. Since wage earners can usually obtain 
relatively favourable outcomes outside the 
household, they may have more power and 
influence on the decision of how to spend the 
money. In addition to wealth position, financial 
knowledge and experience are factors 
contributing to the power of partners in 
bargaining and household financial decision 
making. Alternatively, outcomes may be 
achieved by non-cooperative decision making, in 
which the partners decide on their own but still 
enjoy sharing the household public goods 
(Lundberg & Pollak, 1993; Himmelweit, et al., 
2013). 
 
In the collective model of household decision 
making, the weighted sum of individual utility 
functions is maximized. In this case, the weight 
given to each individual utility function is based 
on the bargaining power of the partners in the 
household (Chiappori, 1988, 1992; Apps & Rees, 
1997) such that higher bargaining power may 
result in higher utility. Bargaining and collective 
models of household decision making do not 
assume income pooling, as in the unitary model. 
Yet, even in those models, income pooling may be 
applied in order to lower transaction costs (Treas, 
1993). 
 
In the second part of the 20th century, family 
structures and labour divisions have changed 
considerably, due to modernization and 
individualization, resulting in more individual 
freedom and less traditional role patterns of 
household partners (Beck-Gernsheim, 2007). 
Differences between generations, social classes, 
income levels, and household division of labour 
may affect household financial management 
practices (Kenney, 2006). This change in 
household processes is reflected in the 
development of household economic models, 
increasingly focusing on bargaining, and raising 
the issue of power in decision making. These two 
developments are examples of why traditional 
role patterns, such as the husband as the main 
wage earner, are disappearing.  
 
In this paper, we do not particularly favour one of 
the microeconomic models. Rather, we adopt the 
idea of different types of households behaving in 
different ways with respect to financial decisions. 
Some couples make decisions more or less jointly, 
whereas others bargain over issues and exercise 
power to reach advantageous outcomes. This 
idea leads to a segmentation of households with 
respect to the type of decision making and 
financial management styles. We construct and 
study different household models in relation to 
financial household decisions, taken jointly or 
separately, and their financial outcomes, the 
absence or presence of financial problems 
regarding issues such as making ends meet and 
paying bills on time.  
 
In addition to restrictions of time and money, 
microeconomic models of the household may 
specify the factors in exercising power in decision 
making. For example, Ott (1995) found positive 
effects of the wife’s education and income on her 
power in the marriage. Also, a partner’s wage rate 
has been found to influence engagement in 




(Dobbelsteen & Kooreman, 1997; Antonides, 
2011). Institutional factors, such as marriage 
contracts, divorce law, and alimony regulations 
may further influence decision power 
(Himmelweit et al., 2013). Even with income 
pooling, inequality in decision power may exist, 
for example, because non-earning women may 
feel uncomfortable spending money they did not 
earn themselves (Kenney, 2006). Microeconomic 
models usually do not describe the processes of 
decision making, which is the domain of 
psychology, sociology, and marketing, to be 
discussed next.  
 
2.2 Psychological, sociological, and marketing 
models of household decision making 
In most cultures, gender inequality in household 
work, income, and power exists. Women 
generally do more household work than men, and 
tend to decrease their household work as their 
earnings increase. However, even if spouses 
contribute equally to the household income, 
women still do more household work than men 
(Bittman et al., 2003; Hook, 2010). Partners 
earning a larger part of the total household 
income usually have more influence on how the 
income should be spent. Mader and Schneebaum 
(2013) find that, across Europe, women often 
make decisions about everyday household 
spending and purchases for themselves and the 
children, whereas men make most complex 
financial decisions in a household such as 
concerning the tax declaration and the purchase 
of durable goods and financial products such as 
mortgages and pension plans. In general, this 
means that men have so-called “orchestration 
power” (Safilios-Rothschild, 1976; Webster, 1998), 
whereas women have “implementation power.” 
Greater equality of income and education 
between partners is generally related to more 
joint decision making on spending and saving. 
 
Another issue in intra-household dynamics is the 
power of partners and its impact on negotiation, 
bargaining and exchange processes. Power 
depends on (1) cultural definitions of who has the 
authority in the household, (2) degree of (in-) 
dependence of partners, for instance their 
personal income and financial contribution to the 
household, (3) role competence and skills, 
including bargaining skills, and (4) (financial) 
knowledge and cognitive competence. The non-
earning partner often has less power and less 
“say” in the decision of how to spend the 
household money. Burgoyne (1990) concludes 
that women, after an interruption of child bearing 
and nurturing, have a disadvantage with regard 
to earning income on the labour market and thus 
less influence on household financial decisions. 
 
McDonald (1980) emphasizes commitment, trust, 
and reciprocity in exchange and negotiation 
processes between partners. Exchange theory 
does not only concern competitive, but also 
cooperative aspects of interaction and equity 
between partners. Note that negotiation is not a 
“one-shot” bargaining but an ongoing process in 
households over an extended period of time 
(Scanzoni & Polonko, 1980) with outcomes that 
may alternate, but balancing the favours of each 
household partner in the long run. Research 
findings on conflict and bargaining strategies of 






Kamleitner et al. (2017) state that, despite the 
increasing financial independence of women, 
most financial decisions tend to be made jointly. 
The only exception appears to be spending 
decisions on everyday goods and services, that 
are often made individually. In marketing, the 
emphasis is usually on individual decision making 
and choice, overlooking the fact that most major 
financial decisions of couples are made together.  
 
2.3 Types of money management  
Ferber and Lee (1974) coined the concept of the 
“family financial officer” (FFO). The FFO is the 
partner, often the husband, who takes the major 
financial decisions concerning, for example, the 
mortgage, tax declaration, and the purchase of 
expensive household items, such as the car and 
living room furniture. The FFO is either a 
reminiscent of the husband as the head of the 
household, or is the person with a better financial 
knowledge and capability than his/her partner. 
 
Pahl (1995) and Vogler (2005) in the UK assessed 
four household money management styles in 
their surveys: (1) joint pool of income and joint 
decision making, (2) female whole wage and 
pocket money for the husband, (3) male whole 
wage and housekeeping allowance for the wife, 
and (4) independent/autonomic money 
management of both partners. The respondents 
were asked which of these four money 
management styles best described the way they 
were managing their money. “Female whole 
wage” means that the wife is the family financial 
officer (FFO; Ferber & Lee, 1974) of the household, 
probably giving pocket money to her husband. 
“Male whole wage” means that the husband is 
the FFO, probably giving a housekeeping 
allowance to his wife. Heimdal and Houseknecht 
(2003), using the International Social Survey 
Programme, also employed the procedure of 
respondents choosing which financial 
management style best describes their situation. 
 
Kenney (2006) asked couples in the US about both 
keeping money separately or jointly, and who 
controlled the money in the household, then used 
the answers to create Pahl’s typology. 26% Used 
a jointly controlled pool, 21% a female-controlled 
pool, 11% male-controlled pool, 15% 
independent management with equal control, 
21% female-controlled separate management, 
and 7% male-controlled separate management. 
Lyngstad et al. (2011) also asked household 
partners whether they had a joint bank account 
or not, and whether the partners consulted each 
other before making a large purchase. Treas 
(1993) focused exclusively on households having 
joint and separate accounts, showing that 64.0% 
of couples in the US have a joint account only, 
17.6% have both joint and separate accounts, 
and 18.0% have separate accounts only. Huang 
et al. (2016) also focused exclusively on joint and 
separate accounts, showing that 30.9% of 
couples in Australia have only a joint account, in 
43.6% of couples each partner has a separate 
account, in 17.3% of couples only women have a 
separate account, and in 8.2% of couples only 
men have a separate account. 
 
Davis and Rigaux (1974) asked their sample of 
Belgian respondents to indicate their partner’s 
influence on decisions in specific domains of 
spending. Three stages of decision making were 
distinguished: problem recognition, search for 




or service. The purchasing decisions may be 
female-dominant (children’s clothing, woman’s 
clothing, food, cleaning products, kitchenware, 
cosmetics), male-dominant (insurance, car), 
syncratic/joint (school, vacation, housing, outside 
entertainment, living room furniture, children’s 
toys), and autonomic (both partners for 
themselves) (man’s clothing, alcoholic beverages, 
garden tools, non-prescription drugs). 
 
In Davis and Rigaux’s (1974) study, most decisions 
(52%) were taken together (syncratic), 20% of 
decisions were taken autonomic ally, 20% of 
decisions were female-dominant, and 8% of 
decisions were male-dominant. Bonfield (1978), 
in a study done in the US, found somewhat 
different proportions of the four groups: 35% 
female-dominant; 30% syncratic; 20% male-
dominant; and 15% autonomic. These differences 
largely depend on the products and services 
included in these studies.  
 
The four decision types are somehow related to 
the microeconomic household models, discussed 
in Section 2.1. Syncratic decision making seems to 
fit the unitary model, based on consensus. The 
male-dominant model fits Becker’s model best 
(1981), as does the female-dominant model with 
male and female roles reversed. Autonomic 
decision making comes closest to the cooperative 
bargaining model. 
 
Muehlbacher et al. (2009) hypothesized that 
gender roles have changed during the last 
decades. Younger couples are expected to make 
their decisions more syncratically and/or 
autonomically and less male/female-dominant 
than older couples. However, contrary to their 
expectations, they did not find gender role 
changes due to age for major purchases such as 
cars, computers, holidays, and living-room 
furniture.  
 
Besides household financial management being 
characterized by the above-mentioned decision-
making styles, financial management includes a 
number of activities such as information seeking 
on financial and other products and services, 
setting life goals and financial goals for the 
household, employing mental budgeting, making 
spending and saving plans, and reaching 
agreement on financial decisions. If persons in a 
household do these activities well, it is expected 
that these persons/couples will have fewer 
financial problems and thus a higher financial 
well-being than persons/couples not doing these 








































In this section, we describe the procedure of 
sampling from a household panel, and the way 
respondents were invited to participate in the 
study, and to fill out the questionnaire. The 
sample included both married and cohabiting 
partners, as advised in Heimdal and Houseknecht 
(2003) and Lyngstad et al. (2011), both couples 
with partners of different gender and couples 
with partners of the same gender, and couples 
with and without children. 
 
3.1 Sample and procedure 
A total of 21,750 members of the consumer panel 
of a market research agency in The Netherlands 
were invited to participate in the study. These 
panel members were selected as members of 
households with two partners of 18 years or older, 
with or without children living at home. 7,012 
Persons reacted to the invitation and received the 
questionnaire. A total of 4,900 persons completed 
the questionnaire. These persons were then 
asked to request their partners to participate, and 
1,205 partners completed the questionnaire as 
well. Asking partners of respondents afterwards 
was done to increase the independence of 
observations. Partners of panel members were 
also 18 years or older. A number of the 
questionnaires were not completely filled out, 
filled out as “straight liners” (giving the same 
scale answer to all or most questions) or partners 
simply copied the responses on the questionnaire 
from the first participant. These questionnaires 
were eliminated from the study. A net total of 





partners completed the questionnaire 
independently. The data were collected online in 
The Netherlands in January 2017.  
 
3.2 Questionnaire 
The questionnaire comprised three blocks of 
questions. The first block consisted of descriptors 
of the households and the partners in a 
household, including household/family size, 
family arrangement (marriage, cohabitation), 
presence and number of children, and the 
presence of joint or separate bank and savings 
accounts. Individual information included gender, 
age, and financial knowledge (five knowledge quiz 
questions on compound interest, inflation, time 
discounting, and money illusion) of both partners 
in households.  
 
The second block of the questionnaire consisted 
of questions on financial behaviour, including 
quality of decision making and financial 
management, information seeking, having life 
goals and financial goals, employing mental 
budgeting, spending and saving plans, and 
agreement with the partner on financial 
decisions. Since the focus of our study is on 
financial management styles, their determinants 
and financial outcomes, these variables were not 
used in the current research. Other variables, 
included in the research, concerned 
sharing/pooling of personal income, having a 
higher income than one’s partner, and perceived 
knowledge to make important financial decisions. 
 




The third block consisted of questions on financial 
outcomes, including monthly savings and total 
debts (euros). Furthermore, this block included 
questions on having an overview of expenses 
including those made by one’s partner, on 
difficulty of making ends meet, on comparing 
prices before making an important purchase, and 
on the last time a financial problem had occurred. 
These financial problems included: not paying a 
personal bill in time, not paying a household bill in 
time, not having enough money on the joint 
account, not having enough money on the 
personal account, and not paying off loans/credit.  
  
3.3 Analyses 
The first block of variables served as background 
factors explaining the household decision-making 
and money-management styles. The variables of 
the third block are mainly dependent variables to 
be explained by the independent variables of the 
first and second block. 
 
Although income was asked in brackets, we 
computed mathematical expectations of the 
income brackets assuming a lognormal 
distribution of income over the brackets, 
separately for the two partners in the household 
(Aitchison & Brown, 1960; Antonides, 1990, pp. 
160-162). Saving and credit information was 
reported in brackets, and we converted this data 
into point estimates by using the bracket mid-
points (and 1.5 times the highest bracket value if 
the amount exceeded that value). 
 
We conducted a multidimensional scaling 
technique called PRINCALS (Gifi, 1985). The 
technique can be considered an extension of 
principal component analysis (PCA). Where PCA 
can handle numerical variables only, PRINCALS 
can also handle ordinal and nominal variables. 
We used PRINCALS to analyse the data 
concerning the last time five different financial 
problems had occurred (last week, last month, 
last year, more than a year ago, never had this 
problem), in order to cluster and summarize this 
data in a meaningful way. Since there were five 
financial problems presented per household with 
two responses per household, the PRINCALS 
analysis was run with ten variables. All ten 
variables were treated as ordinal variables. The 
scaling procedure resulted in interval-type 
measures (quantifications) for each time period 
associated with the occurrence of each financial 
problem, which were then aggregated over the 
five problems and the two partners. The result of 
the scaling procedure was a one-dimension 
solution with a total fit of 0.561, which indicates 
that this dimension explained 56.1% of the 
variance in the answers given by respondents.  
 
The collected data were re-organized in such a 
way that the unit of analyses were households 
rather than individuals. Each household record 
included both the responses of the panel member 
and his/her partner, such that the male partner 
was indicated as partner 1, and the female 
partner as partner 2. Forty households consisted 
of same-gender partners. The partner who was 
originally in the research agency panel was 
indicated as partner 1; the other as partner 2. 
 
Based on information on the presence of bank 
accounts, households were segmented into types 
with joint and/or separate bank accounts, and 
types who reported syncratic, male-dominant, 




decision making. Note that this approach differs 
from Vogler and Pahl’s approach (1994). We did 
not formulate money management styles 
beforehand and let the respondents choose from 
these styles. In this study, we developed different 
groups/segments from partners’ reports of 
having joint or separate bank accounts and 














4.1 Household types 
50.0 Percent of the households in the sample had 
a joint bank account only and neither partner 
reported having a separate bank account, which 
can be considered as total pooling or sharing of 
income. 37.8 Percent of the households had a 
joint account and at least one partner reported 
having a separate bank account as well. This is 
called “partial pooling” of income (Burgoyne et al., 
2007). 10.4 Percent had only separate accounts. 
1.8 Percent had neither a joint account nor 
separate accounts, probably consisting of 
households who did not manage their finances 
themselves. The latter group was omitted from 
the remaining analyses. 
 
Huang et al. (2016) mention the situation of 
individuals who rely exclusively on joint accounts, 
but whose partners also possess an individual 
separate account, as being particularly 
disadvantaged. In our sample, there were 50 such 
individuals of the partner 1 type, and 100 
individuals of the partner 2 type. Since partner 1 
in most cases is the husband, it appears that any 
imbalance arising from such asymmetrical 
situations is to the advantage of women in our 
sample. 
 
In 912 households, both partners completed a 
question about who made decisions about the 
joint bank account. Decision making concerning 
the joint bank account was assessed by 
converting the individual answers into three 
categories: “I always/usually decide myself,” “We 
decide jointly/together,” and “My partner 
always/usually decides” (see Table 1). Note that 
inconsistencies arise if both partners report to 
decide themselves, or if both partners report that 
the other partner makes the decisions. Here, such 
inconsistencies amounted, respectively, to 0.3 + 
0.0 = 0.3 % only, and these households were 
omitted from the remaining analyses. True 
consistency was achieved if one partner reported 
to decide him/herself and the other partner 
reports his/her partner to decide, or both partners 
reported syncratic decision making, which was 
the case for, respectively, 1.4 + 5.6 + 77.9 = 84.9%. 
The remaining responses may be called partially 
consistent (14.8 %). Combining both the 
consistent and partially consistent responses, we  
 













I always/usually decide 0.3 % 3.0 % 1.4 % 














arrived at the following household financial 
management categories. The above-diagonal 
cells of Table 1 (3.0 + 1.4 + 2.1 = 6.5%) were 
considered to indicate male dominance; the 
below-diagonal cells of Table 1 (6.4 + 5.6 + 3.4 = 
15.4%) female dominance.  
 
From Table 1, we assessed three financial 
management styles: syncratic, male-dominant, 
and female-dominant. If there was no joint bank 
account, both partners were assumed to decide 
for themselves, denoted as independent or 
autonomic money management, this being the 
fourth financial management style. Note that 
autonomic money management does not 
exclude that partners decide together on how 
much each partner contributes to joint expenses 
such as expenditure for the children, home, and 
holiday trip (Kamleitner et al., 2017).  
 
In Table 2, based on 1,025 households, seven 
segments are distinguished, based on reported 
joint and separate bank accounts, and on the 
money management regarding the joint account. 
The syncratic money-management style was 
prevailing with 78.0% of the households. 11.3 
Percent of the households were of the autonomic  
 
 
money-management style, with separate 
accounts only. The segments of male-dominant 
and female-dominant money management were  
 
relatively small, respectively, 5.8% and 4.9%. 
Since money-management style was relatively 
independent from having separate accounts, the 
two household type indicators were dealt with 
separately in our analyses. Next, we relate a 
number of background variables to the household 
money-management styles and to having 
separate bank accounts in the household. In 
conclusion, we found similar household types as 
Davis and Rigaux (1974), Pahl (1995), and Vogler 
(2005), although we obtained a higher proportion 
of the syncratic money- management style.  
 
4.2 Determinants of household financial 
management  
In The Netherlands, same-sex couples can marry, 
can have children, and usually arrange their 
finances in the same way as different-sex 
couples. In our sample, neither the distribution of 
household type, nor holding separate bank 
accounts were much different between same-sex 
and different-sex couples, although same-sex 
couples had less other household members and 
were more often living together on a contract 
Table 2. Decision styles (household segments) by having joint/separate bank accounts. 
Money-management style 
 
Only a joint bank 
account 





Syncratic  46.1 % 31.8 % 78.0 %  
Male-dominant  2.7 % 3.0 % 5.8 %  
Female-dominant  2.9 % 2.0 % 4.9 %  
Autonomic (no joint account)  n.a. 11.3 % 11.3 %  




arrangement rather than a marriage. Because we 
took these background variables into account, we 
included both same-sex and different-sex couples 
in the following analysis. 
 
In Table 3, the sample statistics of household 
background variables are shown. In most 
households, partners reported being married in 
community of goods, followed by contractual 
marriage or registered partnership, and 
cohabiting without a formal arrangement. 
Partners’ responses show great consensus. 
Partner 2 more often than partner 1 reported 
having no income, which confirms the Dutch 
situation in which women relatively often take 
full-time care of the children. In The Netherlands, 
in single- earner households, the income earner is 
often the husband. In double-earner households,  
the husband has a full-time job more often than 
his wife (Roes, 2008, Table 1.2, p. 18). Partners  
seemed to agree that partner 1 had a higher 
income than partner 2, although partner 1 
slightly more often reported sharing income by 
transferring money to a joint account, or 
spending on shared expenses such as food and 
children’s clothing. Both partners seemed to 
agree on having enough knowledge to take 
important financial decisions. Their actual 
knowledge, according to the 5-item financial 
literacy scale, was quite high, and somewhat 
higher for partner 1 than for partner 2. The 
average age was in the low fifties, with partner 1 
a little older than partner 2. This reflects that in 
The Netherlands, husbands in their first 
marriage/cohabitation are on average 2.5 years 
older than the wife in her first 
marriage/cohabitation (Smeenk, 1998). Total 
monthly net household income was almost € 
3,000 on average. Half of partners 1 had a 




45% had completed a higher education. 
 
In Table 4, the results of a multinomial logit 
regression analysis of financial management 
styles are shown, with the syncratic financial 
management style as the default. The probability 
of belonging to the male-dominant money-
management style, as compared with the 
syncratic money-management style, was 
negatively related to income sharing only (B = ‒
.505); the other variables did not affect this 
probability. Thus, sharing one's income decreased 
the likelihood of belonging to the male-dominant 
money-management style, relative to the 
syncratic money-management style. The value 
under Exp (B) is the odds ratio for the predictor 
variable. An odds ratio > 1 indicates that 
belonging to the comparison group is more likely 
with one unit increase of the predictor variable; an 
odds ratio < 1 indicates that the default or 
referent group is more likely with one unit 
increase of the predictor variable. The coefficient 
of .60 for income sharing in male dominant 
household types indicates that the probability of 
belonging to the male-dominant style (relative to 
the syncratic style) would diminish by 40% with 
each additional point on the 5-point scale for 
reported income sharing. Put differently, income 
sharing makes it more likely to belong to the 
syncratic money-management style than to the 
male-dominant money-management style. 
Although the same-gender dummy was 
significant, male dominance in this case means 
that partner 1, the one belonging to the 
marketing research panel, was most dominant. 
 
The probability of belonging to the female-
dominant money-management style was 
negatively related only to the objective 
knowledge difference between partner 1 and 
partner 2 (B = ‒.309). This means that if the 
female partner possessed more knowledge than 
her partner, it was more likely that the household 
belonged to the female-dominant rather than to 
the syncratic money-management style. 
 
The probability of belonging to the autonomic 
money-management style was positively related 
to a cohabiting living arrangement without a 
contract or registration (as compared with 
marriage in community of goods) (B = 2.224), 
differences in age (B = .071), and objective 
knowledge difference between partner 1 and 
partner 2 (B = ‒.088), and negatively related to 
income sharing (B = ‒.768). Households without 
contract arrangements were nine times more 
likely to have an autonomic money-
management style than those who were married, 
as shown by the coefficient Exp (B) = 9.247. This 
means that if partners had no partnership 
arrangement (rather than marriage in 
community of goods), differed in age, differed in 
their financial knowledge, and/or did not pool 
their income, it was more likely that the 
household belonged to the autonomic rather 
than to the syncratic money-management style. 
 
In Table 5, the results of a binary logit regression 
analysis of having separate vs. joint bank 
accounts in the household are shown. It appears 
that having a marriage or cohabitation contract, 
as compared with marriage in community of 
goods, and having a large family increased the 
probability of having separate bank accounts, 
whereas income sharing, and perceived 




probability of having separate bank accounts. 
Saying this in another way, the probability of a  
joint bank account was larger, if partners were  
married, their family was small, income was 
pooled, and/or financial knowledge of partners 
was large.  
Table 4. Results of multinomial regression analyses. Estimated effects of variables on belonging to a 
particular financial management style, with the syncratic style as the default. 
 Male-dominant   Female-dominant  Autonomic 
 B SE Exp (B) B SE Exp (B) B SE Exp (B) 
Intercept -0.546 1.915  -1.036 2.215  1.838 1.491  
Family size .174 .142 1.190 -.125 .170 .883 .165 .121 1.179 
Partnership 
arrangement1 
-.191 .370 .826 .069 .389 1.071 .377 .286 1.458 
No partnership 
arrangement1 
-.338 .790 .713 -.181 .794 .835 2.224 .350*** 9.247 
Same-gender 
household 
1.597 0.488 4.937*** n.a. n.a. n.a. .505 .559 1.657 
Age -.003 .016 .997 -.012 .017 .988 -.007 .012 .993 
Age difference -.013 .029 .987 .043 .031 1.044 .071 .021** 1.073 
Missing income .628 .600 1.874 -.377 .682 .686 -.977 .557 .377 
Net household 
income 
.147 .140 1.158 .038 .151 1.039 -.161 .118 .852 
Partner 2 no income -.141 .861 .868 -.010 .920 .990 -1.822 .646 .162 
Relative income 
partner 1 
-.750 .573 .472 -.034 .615 .966 -.888 .396* .412 
Relative income 
partner 1 squared 
.147 .091 1.158 -.014 .097 .922 .138 .064* 1.148 
Income sharing -.505 .128*** .604 -.013 .182 .978 -.768 .102*** .464 
Perceived 
knowledge 
-.223 .306 .800 -.304 .336 .820 .238 .258 1.268 
Knowledge partner 1 .135 .144 1.144 -.145 .136 .865 -.104 .107 .901 
Knowledge 
difference 
.129 .128 1.138 -.309 .152* .734 .230 .099* 1.258 
Intermediate 
education partner 1 
-.247 .787 .781 1.025 1.069 2.787 -.159 .609 .853 
High education 
partner 12 
-.164 .406 .849 .437 .551 1.549 -.052 .315 .949 
Nagelkerke R2= 0.272; * p<0.05, **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 





4.3 Financial outcomes of household-decision 
types 
Next, we conducted an analysis of variance for a 
number of financial household outcomes with 
household financial management style (male 
dominant vs. female dominant vs. autonomic vs. 
syncratic) and bank account type (no separate 
bank accounts vs. separate bank accounts) as 
fixed factors. The financial household outcomes 
included savings, debts, making ends meet, 
having an overview of expenses, making price 
comparisons, and how long ago several financial 
problems had occurred. The latter variable was  
 
 
constructed by multidimensional scaling 
(PRINCALS) of the five relevant variables for each 
partner. Table 6 summarizes the results. 
 
Reported savings were not very different across 
financial management styles and bank account 
types. Only savings reported by partner 2 (mostly 
females) in households with syncratic financial 
management were higher (€ 274) than those 
reported for households with autonomic financial 
management (€ 187). Total reported household 
debts were not significantly different across 
financial management styles. Difficulty of making 
 
Table 5. Estimated effects of variables on having a separate bank account (having only a joint account 
is the default). 
 
 B SE Exp(B) 
Intercept 6.378 1.111*** 
588.604 
Family size .022 .084*** 1.022 
Partnership arrangement1 .958 .202*** 2.606 
No partnership arrangement1 2.351 .449 10.500 
Same-gender household .600 .397 1.823 
Age -.001 .009 .999 
Age difference .014 .015 1.014 
Missing income -.138 .333 .871 
Net household income .054 .077 1.056 
Partner 2 no income -.958 .463 .384 
Relative income partner 1 -.459 .302 .632 
Relative income partner 1 squared .080 .048 1.083 
Income sharing -1.154 .109*** .315 
Perceived knowledge -.340 .167* .712 
Knowledge partner 1 .039 .074 1.039 
Knowledge difference .048 .071 1.049 
Intermediate education partner 12 -.473 .391 .623 
High education partner 12 -.077 .203 .926 
Nagelkerke R2= 0.372; * p<0.05, **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 




ends meet was significantly higher in female-
dominant than in syncratic financial 
management styles, as reported by both partner 
1 and partner 2. This could mean that women did 
less well as financial managers. This result cannot 
be explained by a lower income of female-
dominant households, as shown by the 
insignificant differences in income across 
financial management styles (Table 4).  
 
Partner 1 of female-dominant money-
management style reported making less price 
comparisons than partner 1 of the other money-
management styles. For partner 2, there were no 
such differences. Also, partner 1 of female-
dominant money-management style reported 
having much less overview of expenses than 
partner 1 of the other money-management 
styles, whereas partner 2 in female-dominant 
money- management style reported having a 
much better overview. These results may be 
partly due to role division in these types of 
households. Finally, partners of male-dominant 
money-management style and those with 
separate bank accounts reported a significantly 
shorter period when financial problems had 
occurred than partners of the other money-
management styles, indicating that financial 
Table 6. Household financial outcomes by financial management style and having separate accounts 
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Note: 1 Reported by partner 1; 2 reported by partner 2; different superscripts in each row indicate significant 




problems were more frequent for male-dominant 
money-management style and in households 
with separate bank accounts. 
 
We found one significant interaction effect of 
financial management styles and bank account 
type (not reported in Table 6). The overview of 
expenses of partner 2 in male-dominant financial 
management style was higher with separate 
bank accounts than with joint accounts, whereas 
the overview of expenses of partner 2 in female-
dominant financial management style was 























There is a clear historical trend in the literature 
from male/husband-dominant (Becker, 1981; 
Ferber & Lee, 1974) financial management of 
households in the 1980s to syncratic/joint money 
management, financial decision making, and 
partial or full pooling/sharing of income between 
partners nowadays. This trend seems to be 
reflected in the large prevalence of joint decision 
making in our study in The Netherlands.  
 
We found that partners of households with a joint 
bank account are likely to be married, that their 
families are small, that they pool their income, 
and that they have a relatively large financial 
knowledge/literacy. We speculate that early-
relationship partners bring their separate bank 
and savings accounts into their marriage or 
cohabitation, and then open a joint bank and 
savings account for joint savings and expenses, 
such as buying a house, home improvement, 
expenses on children, and holiday trips. This is a 
case of partial pooling (Burgoyne et al., 2007). Kan 
and Laurie (2013) also found that married 
partners are more likely to hold joint savings, 
investments and debts than cohabiting partners. 
 
Household segmentation with respect to 
syncratic, male/female dominance, and 
autonomic decision-making and financial 
management styles is insightful. The syncratic 
financial management style is prevalent among 
77.9% of Dutch households. If partners do not 
pool their income, it is likely that the household 





management style. However, if the female 
partner possesses more financial knowledge than 
her partner, it is likely that the household 
employs a female-dominant financial 
management style. If partners have no 
partnership arrangement, differ in age and/or in 
financial knowledge, and/or do not pool their 
income, it is likely that the household employs an 
autonomic financial management style. A 
tentative conclusion might be that similar 
characteristics of partners make joint decision 
making more likely than dissimilar characteristics 
of partners. Antonides (2011) also found that 
husbands who are more freely spending money, 
are less likely to be involved in household 
investment decision making and paying bills. 
 
Partners not only bring their bank and savings 
accounts into their marriage or cohabitation, they 
also bring in their financial literacy. With a longer 
duration of the relationship, it is likely that the 
financially more knowledgeable partner will do 
the financial management and has more “say” in 
the major financial decisions of the household. 
This means that with a longer duration of the 
relationship and more division of labour, the role 
of the family financial officer (FFO) will become 
more apparent. However, like Muehlbacher et al. 
(2009), we found no effect of age in this study. 
The financial management styles of young 
couples do not significantly differ from old 
couples. It is not clear to what extent this result 
reflects a non-existing effect of role specialization 




or ageing, a non-existing generation effect, or 
both. 
 
This study is on the joint and separate financial 
management of couples. The focus is the financial 
contribution (earning, spending, saving) of the 
partners to the household. Partners also 
contribute to the household in kind, for instance 
in unpaid household work. This also increases the 
welfare of the household. However, the amount 
of household work may differ between partners 
and its value may be insufficiently recognized. 
Especially in autonomic and male/female-
dominant financial management, the partner 
contributing in kind may have less power and 
influence in financial decisions of the household. 
More research is needed on the contributions in 
money and in kind to the welfare of households. 
 
We found that syncratic and autonomic money-
management styles tend to result in less financial 
problems than male-dominant and female-
dominant money-management styles. If one 
person of the household is dominant in financial 
management (the Family Financial Officer, FFO), 
it is likely that his/her partner is less involved and 
less satisfied with the household financial 
outcomes. With a syncratic money-management 
style, it is likely that partners discuss purchases 
and expenses beforehand, control each other, 
avoid impulsivity, correct mistakes, and thus 
avoid financial problems. Barber and Odean 
(2001) found that overconfidence in stock 
investment decision making, as reflected in 
excessive trade and lower returns, is higher for 
men than for women. However, the difference is 
smaller for married partners than for single 
individuals, suggesting beneficial effects of joint 
financial management. Joint decision making, 
self-control and partner control seem to be the 
ingredients for avoiding financial problems. 
The avoidance of financial problems is likely to be 
a strong determinant of financial satisfaction, 
welfare and well-being of partners. Two 
dimensions may be distinguished in financial 
well-being: current money-management stress 
and expected future financial security 
(Netemeyer et al., 2018). However, Kan and 
Laurie (2013) do not find differences in well-being 
of spouses between those who hold joint 
investments and those who hold separate 
investments. In future studies, the relationships 
between financial problems and these 
dimensions of well-being should be investigated 
further. 
 
Results of this study may be used by banks to 
segment and advise their customers, and for 
advice and policy on financial literacy, 
expenditure, debt and saving of consumers in 
households. For example, relationship partners 
who just have started cohabitation or marriage 
might be offered a joint account for free (at least 
for some time), thus hopefully stimulating further 
joint financial decision making and the prevention 
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